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TOO GOOD, TOO BAD: "OVERQUALIFIED"
OLDER WORKERS
JEFF MORNEAU*

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly in today's market, employers are rejecting older
"overqualified" applicants for jobs that they appear to be able to
perform. Even though the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
{"ADEA")l protects older applicants from discrimination based on
age, an employer may be able to reject an older applicant if it be
lieves the applicant is overqualified and therefore likely to become
bored or transfer to a different job. Such an action by an employer
can create problems by leaving older workers without a job and
without any remedy for an adverse employment action taken, at
least arguably, because of their age. Suppose, for example, the fol
lowing situation:
John Martin is fifty-five years old and has been a school su
perintendent for the past three years. As superintendent he
turned the school district from one of the worst in the state into
one of the best. Previously, he was a principal at a public high
school in the same school district and was regarded as one of the
best ever to lead the public high school. Besides being an excel
lent superintendent and principal, he taught for over fifteen years
at a private high school that only accepted the brightest students
from the community. Furthermore, he had graduate degrees in
English and School Administration from a prestigious university.
After his term as superintendent, John decided he wanted to go
back to teaching.

* Associate with the law firm of Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas, LLP, Spring
field, Massachusetts; LL.M, 1999, Georgetown University (labor and employment);
J.D., 1998, Western New England College School of Law.
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.c. §§ 621-633a (1994).
The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer. .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age.
[d. § 623(a)(1).
45
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John applied for many different types of entry-level teaching
jobs because no lateral positions were available. He applied to
teach at an elementary school in a large city. Despite the availa
bility of a position and his apparent qualifications, the school
board rejected John because it thought that he would be bored,
unchallenged, and uninterested in teaching children from the in
ner city after making policy decisions and being involved in vari
ous administrations. Furthermore, the school board thought that
after he realized how difficult the students were, John would seek
alternative employment. Therefore, he was not hired.
John also applied to teach at a middle school. This school
board did not hire John either. The board reasoned that as a
former superintendent he would attempt to control the adminis
tration of the school as well as his classroom. Furthermore, the
school board reasoned that the academic program would not of
fer him the challenge and sophistication that a person of his
background would want, and believed he was better suited to
teach at a private school or remain a school administrator. The
middle school's board also thought that once John realized how
boring and simple classes were, he would quit.

Does this sound reasonable? Well, for reasons remarkably
similar to these, employers are rejecting older job applicants. Re
jection of older applicants based on their "overqualification" has
become a serious problem, in part, because Americans are living
longer than ever before. 2 As baby boomers move into their fifties,
it is not surprising that a large part of America's workforce is ag
ing. 3 The effect that the growing population of older adults will
have on the workforce is still unclear. However, older workers may
feel less secure as to their future in their jobs. This sense of insecu
2. See generally RESOURCE SERVS. GROUP, ET AL., A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERI
CANS: 1997 (1997). "The older population-persons 65 years or older-numbered 33.9
million in 1996. They represented 12.8% of the U.S. population, about one in every
eight Americans. The number of older Americans increased by 2.6 million or 8% since
1990, compared to an increase of 6% for the under-65 population." Id. at 1. Since 1900,
the percentage of Americans 65 and over has more than tripled (4.1 % in 1900 to 12.8%
in 1996), and the number has increased nearly eleven times (from 3.1 million to 33.9
million). See id. "The older population itself is getting older. In 1996 the 65-74 age
group (18.7 million) was eight times larger than in 1900, but the 75-84 group (11.4 mil
lion) was 16 times larger and the 85+ group (3.8 million) was 31 times larger." Id. "By
2030, there will be about 70 million older persons, more than twice their number in
1996. People 65+ are projected to represent almost 13% of the population in the year
2000 but will be 20% by 2030." Id. at 2.
3. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, OLDER AMERICANS IN THE WORKFORCE:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 6 (1987) (stating that in 1986, persons age 40 and above
composed 37.8% of the workforce; by 2010, people age 40 and older are expected to
comprise nearly half of the workforce).
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rity is not unfounded. Recently, declining profitability has led
many companies to cut costS.4 Often this is accomplished by mak
ing large-scale reductions in workforces, or downsizing. 5 Downsiz
ing is most often achieved by thinning out the ranks of middle
management, using automation, and by establishing incentives for
early retirement. 6 Whichever method is used, a disproportionately
large number of older workers are displaced. 7
Unemployment can have devastating consequences to older
workers whether due to a reduction in force, age discrimination, or
any other reason. S Those who are newly unemployed are con
fronted with the prospects of finding a new job and stabilizing their
lives often after many years in the same position with the same em
ployer. These older workers may seek re-employment, but are
4. See generally AARP, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND OLDER WORKERS: A ROAD
MAp TO THE 21ST CENTURY (1995) (discussing trends within the business workplace
affecting older employees).
5. According to the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the third
quarter of 1999 there were 1099 mass lay-off actions by employers that involved 242,
289 workers. See Bureau of Labor Statistics (visited Apr. 8, 2000)<http://stats.bls.gov!
news.release!mslo.toc.htm>. Therefore, despite the current booming economy, mass re
ductions in force ("RIFs") continue to be commonplace. See generally Bureau of Labor
Statistics News Releases website (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://stats.bls.gov!new
srels.htm> (providing current national statistics regarding mass reductions); see also
COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, ABA, DOWNSIZING IN AN AG
ING WORK FORCE: THE LAW, THE LIMrrs, AND THE LESSONS 6 n. 9 (1992) [hereinafter
DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE]. An American Management Association
("AMA") survey in July 1987 found that of 1,134 companies that responded, 45% had
undergone significant RIFs between January 1986 and June 1987. See id. "A later
AMA survey conducted in 1989 showed that in the preceding year, 39% of the 1,084
companies and nonprofit organizations surveyed by the AMA reduced their
workforces, cutting an average of 162 employees." Id.
6. See DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORKFORCE, supra note 5, at 2-4.
7. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5 (noting the large number of work
ers layed off in 1999).
8. See National Senior Citizens Law Ctr., Untender Mercies: Layoff and the Older
Worker, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1104, 1104 (1989) (finding that nearly one million
workers over the age of 55 lost their jobs because of plant closings or employment
cutbacks between 1981 and 1985). One-half of these workers were displaced from the
jobs they had held for 15 years or more; less than half were re-employed. See id; see
also U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJEC
TIONS, S. REp. No. 101-249, vol. 2, at 93 (1989) [hereinafter SPEOAL COMM. ON AGING]
(finding that older workers endure greater earnings loss in subsequent jobs than do
younger workers and are more likely to give up looking for another job altogether);
Tamar Lewin, When or Whether to Retire: New Ways to Handle Strain, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1990, at Al (according to Commonwealth Fund Senior Vice President Thomas
Moloney, "[o]f the older people who are out of the workforce, half are satisfied, a quar
ter can't work because of their health or family situations, and the other quarter are
very unhappy about the situation they're in.... That quarter represents about two
million people ...").

48

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:45

often forced to apply for entry-level (and therefore lower wage)
jobs because they lack the training necessary for the higher paying
jobs in different industries or because middle or upper-management
positions are not available. Yet, older workers are even prevented
from attaining lower level positions when employment recruiters
reject them on the basis that they are overqualified. 9
"Overqualification" is a sUbjective quality that cannot be mea
sured accurately through a standardized test. Thus, when supervi
sors reject older applicants because they are overqualified, there is
a real danger that the supervisors are in fact acting with discrimina
tory intent, or at a minimum, are basing an employment decision on
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices. Because of this danger
and its potential effect on older workers, it is important to consider
whether "overqualification" should be considered a legitimate rea
son not to hire an applicant. This Article will examine the differ
ences in three circuit court opinions that have considered the use of
"overqualification" by employers as a reason to reject older
applicants.
The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have addressed the issue
of "overqualification" within the context of the ADEA in the hiring
process. In Taggart v. Time, Inc., 10 the Second Circuit held that re
jecting older applicants based on "overqualification" can be a mask
for age discrimination, and is therefore not a legitimate reason for
rejection. l1 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in Stein v. National City
Bank12 and the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North
America 13 held that although rejecting applicants based on "over
qualification" grounds may at times be a mask for age discrimina
tion, it also may be a legitimate reason to reject applicants.14
Part I of this Article addresses the origin and development of
the ADEA and discusses the elements necessary for a plaintiff to
9. See generally Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose by Any Other Name No Longer
Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 530, 539-40 & n.71 (1996) (discussing
the age proxy doctrine and how using overqualifcation is an impermissible proxy for
age in the employment context).
10. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
11. See id. at 48. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Taggart.
12. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Stein.
13. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra Part II.C for a discussion of Insurance
Co. of N. Am.
14. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421 (stating that "reliance on 'over
qualification' as a disqualifying factor in hiring can easily mask age discrimination when
'overqualified' is not defined"); Stein, 942 F.2d at 1066.
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establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA.
Part II examines the opinions rendered in Taggart v. Time, Inc.,
Stein v. National City Bank, and EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North
America. Part III of this Article identifies types of objective and
subjective evidence used in discrimination cases, analyzes the use of
"overqualification" by employers to establish a legitimate nondis
criminatory reason for an adverse employment decision, and criti
ques the Ninth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Insurance Co. of
North America. Part III further provides a framework for how em
ployers should handle overqualified applicants that they do not
wish to hire so as to limit their potential liability under the ADEA.
I.

BACKGROUND

When Congress passed Title VIps in 1964 to protect minorities
from discrimination in the workplace, it declined to pass legislation
that would protect older Americans from discrimination based
upon age. 16 However, aware that age discrimination might be a
problem, Congress did require the Secretary of Labor to undertake
a study of age discrimination in section 715 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.17 The study ultimately revealed that age discrimination
was a problem for American workers and that it had an adverse
effect on the ability of older workers to find and retain employ
menUs It was from this report that the ADEA was born.
15. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Section 2000e-(2)(a)(I) provides that
it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
16. See Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1527,
1539 nn.40-41 (1996); Carol E.B. McKenny, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Em
ployment Legislation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1157, 1158 (1981). Prior to the ADEA, age
discrimination claims could only be brought in the few states that had enacted laws
prohibiting such discrimination. See 2 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI
NATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 22.1(2) (1990). Employees of the federal government,
who were not protected by state law, had to bring age discrimination claims under
either the equal protection or due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. While
government workers were not originally protected under the ADEA, the Act was
amended in 1974 to protect them as well. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIS
CRIMINATION LAW § 6.01(b), at 506-07 (1988).
17. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-14 (1994); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RE·
PORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION
715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS].
18. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 17. Although the study determined
that there was "no evidence of prejudice based on dislike or intolerance for the older
worker," the evidence did indicate that organizations discriminated on the basis of age.
See id. Furthermore, the study determined that discrimination was a result of errone
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History and Scope of the ADEA

Four years later, in 1967, Congress passed the ADEA to pro
tect older Americans from discrimination in the workplace. 19 The
asserted goal of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment."2o As originally enacted, the ADEA only pro
tected individuals working in the private sector between the ages of
forty and sixty-five. 21 Since then, however, the reach of the Act has
expanded to protect a greater number of employees. 22 Currently,
the ADEA protects employees23 age forty or older from being dis
criminated against by an employer24 on account of their age. The
employee is protected regardless of whether the discrimination oc
curs in terms of hiring, discharging, compensation, or any other
conditions of employment. 25
ous assumptions employers had adopted concerning the effects of age on economic effi
ciency in the workplace. See id.; see also SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 8, at 75
(recognizing that once persons age 55-64 lose their jobs, they suffer the longest duration
of unemployment of any group in the country).
19. See ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994»; see also ROSSEIN, supra note 16, §22.1(2) (stating that prior
to the ADEA, age discrimination claims could only be brought in the few states that
had enacted laws prohibiting such discrimination).
20. 29 U.S.c. § 621(b) (1994); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
610 (1993) ("Congress' promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that
older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate and stig
matizing stereotypes."). Congress found that older persons "find themselves disadvan
taged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when
displaced from jobs." 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(I) (1994).
21. See PLAYER, supra note 16, § 6.01(b), at 507.
22. In 1974, the ADEA was amended to expand coverage to federal, state, and
local government employees. See PLAYER, supra note 16, § 6.01(b), at 507. In 1978, the
ADEA was amended to extend coverage to individuals up to the age of 70. See id.
§ 6.01(c), at 507. In 1986, Congress expanded coverage to any individual over the age
of 40. See id. § 6.01(e), at 508.
23. See 29 U.S.c. § 630(f) (1994) (stating that an employee under the ADEA is
"an individual employed by any employer"). The term employee also encompasses
U.S. citizens employed overseas by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. See id.
§ 630(f)(1).
24. See id. § 630(b). In order for an employer to be considered subject to the
ADEA, the employer must be a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce"
who has 20 or more employees each day for at least 20 calendar weeks of either "the
current or preceding calendar year." Id. The ADEA also provides that the term em
ployer includes all private sector organizations which employ at least twenty people, all
state and local governments, and any agent of such persons or organizations. See id.
§ 630(a)-(b).
25. See id. § 623(a). See supra note 1 for the text of § 623(a)(I).
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The ADEA covers many, but not all, employer-employee rela
tionships. For example, the ADEA does not cover uniformed per
sonnel in the active or reserve armed forces. 26 Also, true
independent contractors are not protected by the ADEA because
they are not considered "employees" of covered employers. 27 In
addition, a number of affirmative defenses are available to defend
ants in ADEA cases. For example, an employment decision based
on a reasonable factor other than age or good cause is lawful.28 A
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") is a defense that ac
knowledges that age may be used as a criterion in an employment
practice or policy, but only if the use of age is "reasonably neces
sary to the normal operation of the particular business."29 In addi
tion, a bona fide employee benefit plan and a bona fide seniority
system which "is not intended to evade the purposes of [the
ADEA]" are also affirmative defenses. 3o A release that meets the
standards set by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
("OWBPA") is another defense. 31 A good faith effort to conform
with, or in reliance on, a written interpretation of the EEOC guide
lines is also a defense. 32 Still, as a preliminary matter, a claimant
26. See Spain v. Ball, 928 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Kawitt v. United
States, 842 F.2d 951, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1988); Helm v. California, 722 F.2d 507, 509 (9th
Cir. 1983).
27. See 29 U.S.c. § 630(f) (1994). Indian tribes are also exempt from the defini
tion of employer. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986
F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993).
28. See 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) & (3) (1994).
29. See id. § 623(f)(1); see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,
407 (1985) (holding that a BFOQ defense is available only if the BFOQ is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation or essence of the defendant's business). Compare
Coupe v. Federal Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022, 1023 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S.Ct. 1300 (1998) (noting that the Federal Aviation Administration's rule prohibiting
employment of pilots over age 60 was a valid BFOQ), and Murnane v. American Air
lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that the practice of only hiring
pilots under the age of 40 is a BFOQ because the age requirement was "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the airline"), and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding the employer bus company did establish
a BFOQ based on age), with EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 860 F.2d 665 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the police department's policy of mandatorily retiring state
troopers at the age 55 is not a BFOQ under the ADEA since it is not reasonably linked
to an employee's physical fitness), affd in part, rev'd in part, 80 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir.
1996); and Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307-09 (4th Cir. 1981)
(finding that the practice of not hiring new pilots who are over the age of 35 is not a
BFOQ in view of the carrier's failure to establish a relationship between the policy and
airline safety).
30. See 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(2)(A) (1994).
31. See id. § 626(f)(1).
32. See id. § 626(e) (cross-referencing § 259).
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under the ADEA must show that both the employee and employer
are subject to the Act.
B.

Discrimination and the Prima Facie Case

ADEA violations may be established under either the dispa
rate impact or disparate treatment of liability.33 In the ADEA con
text, a disparate treatment claim arises when the employer treats
some people less favorably than others because of their age. 34 In
such cases, the central question is whether the employer's actions
were motivated by discriminatory intent. 35 By contrast, the dispa
33. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996); Fisher v.
Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a
disparate impact claim based upon a program to measure and evaluate performance);
Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (reviewing a salary policy
that credited newly employed teachers for up to 10 years prior teaching experience, plus
a maximum of four years for experience earned more than 10 years ago); MacPherson
v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the alleged
practice of paying market rates to newly hired faculty but not to incumbent professors);
Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing subjective
discretion of managers when making reduction in force ("RIF") decisions); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1374 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that plain
tiffs failed to demonstrate that any of the employer's hiring practices fell more harshly
on older applicants); Nolting v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 799 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (8th
Cir. 1986) (discussing operator evaluation system devised to measure job performance
and productivity); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing
high salary as a criterion for RIF). But see Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701
(1st Cir. 1999) ("Since 1993, a majority of the courts of appeals that have addressed the
question have held that the ADEA does not recognize causes of action premised on
disparate impact ... proof of intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to liability
under the ADEA."); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating that the ADEA does not prohibit "decisions based on criteria which
merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers under
forty"). See generally Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact
Doctrine to the ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 (1984-85).
34. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); cf International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (discussing disparate treatment in terms of Title
VII claims).
35. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (stating that '''[p]roof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred"') (quoting Interna·
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15); cf Brinkley·Obu v. Hughes Training,
Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 34445 & n.17 (4th Cir. 1994) (differentiating plaintiff's burden in
Equal Pay Act claim, to show unequal pay compared to similarly situated male co
worker, without regard to motive, from plaintiff's burden in Title VII claim, in which
plaintiff must prove the differentiation was "motivated by discriminatory intent");
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he ultimate issue in a disparate
treatment case is whether the disparity resulted from unlawful discriminatory ani
mus."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(stating that the employer must submit sufficient evidence to permit "the trier of fact
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discrim
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rate impact theory of liability holds that an employer's facially neu
tral policy or practice may be unlawful, even absent a showing of
discriminatory intent, merely because it has a significant adverse
impact upon a protected group.36 Thus, disparate treatment focuses
on discriminatory intent, while disparate impact focuses on discrim
inatory results. As the three cases discussed in this Article demon
strate, ADEA claims are typically brought under the disparate
treatment theory because this type of discrimination is more readily
apparent to potential plaintiffs who are adversely affected. In addi
tion, a prima facie case in a disparate impact case may be more
difficult to establish than in a disparate treatment case because the
plaintiff must do more than raise an inference of discriminatory im
pact; the plaintiff must demonstrate the discriminatory impact
itself.37
To successfully bring a claim under the ADEA, whether under
a disparate impact or disparate treatment theory of liability, a plain
tiff must initially set forth a prima facie case. In disparate impact
cases, a prima facie case is established by showing that an em
ployer's policy or practice has a significantly disproportionate im
pact upon a protected c1ass. 38 Once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, the employer may defend its policy or practice by
proving that the policy is "job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity."39 However, even if the em
inatory animus") (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
257 (1981)).
36. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (citing International Bhd. of Team
sters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988) (plurality opinion); see also EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 98-3897,
1999 WL 711068, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 14, 1999); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v.
Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1217 (D. Conn. 1992) ("The Second
Circuit has stated a disparate impact analysis examines a facially-neutral policy or prac
tice, such as a hiring test or zoning law, for its differential impact or effect on a particu
lar group, whereas a disparate [differential] treatment analysis involves differential
treatment of similarly situated persons or groups."). Under the ADEA, the plaintiff's
protected group would be those "individuals who are at least 40 years of age." See 29
U.S.c. § 631(a) (1994).
37. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 1999).
38. See id. See supra note 36 for additional disparate impact cases. There are two
tests of statistical significance used to determine whether there is a substantially dispro
portionate impact. The first is a .05 probability level or two standard deviations. See 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14B(5) (1999). The other test is the "80 percent rule" which provides that
an employee establishes a prima facie case of adverse impact when the selection crite
rion operates to select members of a protected group at a rate less than four fifths that.
of an allegedly preferred counterpart. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1999).
39. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at
1312.
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ployer demonstrates that the policy or practice is job-related and
consistent with business necessity, a plaintiff may still prove unlaw
ful age discrimination by showing the existence of "an alternative
employment practice" with a lesser adverse impact which the em
ployer refuses to adopt. 40 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve
the issue of whether an ADEA claim may be established by proving
disparate impact treatment. 41
In disparate treatment cases a prima facie case may be based
either on a presumption of discrimination arising from the consider
ation of factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,42 or
by more direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 43 Among dispa
rate treatment cases, each case will be handled differently by the
courts depending on whether direct or indirect evidence of discrimi
nation is offered. 44
1.

Direct Evidence

Direct evidence of discrimination is "[ e ]vidence which in and
of itself suggests that the person or persons with the power to hire,
fire, promote, and demote the plaintiff were animated by an illegal
employment criterion .... "45 When a plaintiff proceeds with direct
40. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (1994); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at
1312 (stating that in an ADEA case the plaintiff must offer an alternative employment
practice that serves the employer's goals without a discriminatory effect).
41. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609-10 (holding that the disparate treatment
theory of liability is available under the ADEA). The Court has not, however, ruled on
whether the disparate impact theory of liability is also available. See id. at 618 (Ken
nedy, J., concurring) (stating that "substantial arguments" exist against applying dispa
rate impact analysis to the ADEA).
42. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (holding that the complainant in a Title VII trial
must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, which may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications). See infra Part I.B.2 for a dis
cussion of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in the context of the ADEA; see also Ha
zen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612 (noting that McDonnell Douglas creates a burden of
proof framework applicable to ADEA cases).
43. See generally JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 339-40
(4th ed. 1992) (defining "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence). See infra Part 1.B.1
for a discussion of what may constitute direct evidence.
44. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (finding
that the burden shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas is not applicable in
ADEA cases where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination).
45. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Miles v.
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 873-74 (11th Cir. 1985).
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evidence of discriminatory intent, the evidence by itself is sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination. 46
Direct evidence usually takes the form of statements made by man
agers or supervisors demonstrating their bias. 47 Statements by
"nondecision-makers" or statements by decision-makers unrelated
to the adverse employment decision usually do not suffice. 48
Furthermore, for a remark to constitute direct evidence, it
must bear some relationship to the employment decision in ques
tion. Inappropriate but isolated and ambiguous comments that
amount to no more than "stray remarks" will not suffice.49 How
46. See Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (find
ing that direct evidence, which is rarely found in discrimination cases, is evidence that
"proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption") (citations
omitted).
47. See EEOC v. G-K-G Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that
the comment by the decision-making supervisor that the plaintiffs accounts could use
some "younger blood" constituted direct evidence of discrimination); Sischo-Nownejad
v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
that a supervisor's reference to a teacher as "an old warhorse" and to her students as
"little old ladies" constituted direct evidence of age and gender bias); Morgan v. Arkan
sas Gazette, 897 F.2d 945, 951 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the city circulation manager's
statement that the plaintiff was "an old fuddy-duddy" constituted direct evidence of
discrimination); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
that references to older workers as "old fogies" and statements to plaintiff that if he
were younger he could work for the manager were probative of pretext); Siegel v. Al
pha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the manager's use of the
phrase "old dogs won't hunt" when referring to the plaintiff and another older em
ployee, coupled with evidence of favorable employment evaluations for younger em
ployees, raised a material issue as to whether the reasons given for the plaintiffs
discharge were pretextual).
48. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot justify requiring the em
ployer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria.
Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated
to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this regard.");
Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that an alleged
comment by the company vice-president that management planned to "weed out the
old ones" does not undermine the defendant's articulated reason for the plaintiffs dis
missal because it was undisputed that the vice-president played no part in the termina
tion decision); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412
(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that evidence that a senior vice-president told the president not
to terminate the plaintiff until he had a younger replacement was insufficient to support
a verdict for the plaintiff because the president did not need the vice-president's concur
rence to terminate the plaintiff).
49. See Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elec., 82 F.3d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that to "qualify as direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that
the remarks 'were related to the employment decision in question"') (quoting McCar
thy v. Kemper Life Ins. Cos., 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1991»; Cone v. Longmont
United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the CEO's statement
that the hospital "need[s] some new young blood" and that "long-term employees have
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ever, if the plaintiff's direct evidence proves that his or her age was
a motivating or substantial factor in the contested employment de
cision, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. 50 To meet this
burden, the defendant must then show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same employment decision would have been
made even if the improper criteria played no role in the decision. 51
In the absence of such a showing by the defendant, summary judg
ment will be granted in favor of the plaintiff. 52 However, due to the
heightened awareness of employers, managers, and supervisors rea diminishing return" are stray remarks and insufficient to defeat the hospital's motion
for summary judgment); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
inappropriate personal opinions do not prove employer acted with discriminatory in
tent); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the decision
maker's statement "[we] don't necessarily like grey hair," where not tied to the plain
tiff's termination, was a stray remark that could not defeat summary judgment for the
employer); Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the stray remark that the plaintiff is an "old fart" is insufficient to raise an issue of
material fact); McCarthy, 924 F.2d at 686-87 (stating that racial comments alone cannot
suffice to prove discrimination; it must be shown that race was in fact relied upon in
making the employment decision); DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n,
879 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring in § 1981 cases a nexus between the alleged
animus and the decision to terminate); ct. EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d
1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding the trial court's finding that racially hostile re
marks were so "commonplace, overt and denigrating" that they created an atmosphere
charged with racial hostility); Siegal v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990)
(reversing summary judgment for the employer in light of the company president's re
peated use of the phrase "old dogs won't hunt").
50. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("[T]he plaintiff who shows that an
impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision has
thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to show that it would have made the
same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive."); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (finding that once an illegal motive is proved
to have been a significant factor in an employment decision, the defendant must show
"by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision"
even absent that factor); see also Haynes v. W.C. Caye & Co., 52 F.3d 928, 931 (11th
Cir. 1995); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993);
Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir. 1991).
51. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252-53.
52. A party is entitled to summary judgment upon a showing that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All justifiable inferences must be drawn in
favor of the non-movant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). Conc1usory allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judg
ment when the movant has met its summary judgment burden. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992). To successfully op
pose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations
or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986).
A material fact is any fact "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the gov
erning law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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garding their potential liability, "there is rarely direct evidence of
discrimination."53 Given the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence
of discrimination, plaintiffs have been forced to resort to the "indi
rect method" of proof articulated by the Supreme Court in McDon
nell Douglas.
2.

Indirect Evidence

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,54 and more recently in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,55 the Supreme Court articulated
a burden shifting scheme for discrimination cases. 56 Although the
plaintiff must always establish a prima facie case, the Supreme
Court has stated that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie
case of disparate treatment is not onerous."57 In an ADEA hiring
case,58 the prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) the plain
tiff is a member of the protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the
position at issue; and (4) the plaintiff was treated less favorably
than others not in the protected class. 59
53. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 621 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United
States Postal Servo Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("There will
seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."); Rosen v.
Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) ("An employer who discriminates is un
likely to leave a 'smoking gun,' such as a notation in an employee's personnel file,
attesting to a discriminatory intent."); cf Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668
F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "direct, smoking gun, evidence of dis
crimination" is not required for the plaintiff to prevail), affd 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir.
1988).
54. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
55. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
56. "The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination .... The burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. See supra note
42 for the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme.
57. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981). The
requirement of a prima facie case of age discrimination is not met unless there is "at
least a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal
discrimination for which it establishes a 'legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.'"
O'Connor v. Consolidated Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996) (quoting Bur
dine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7). Thus, an inference of discrimination cannot be made where
an employer replaces a worker with someone under 40 if that person is only insignifi
cantly younger. See id.
58. The Supreme Court has never decided whether the McDonnell Douglas test
applies to ADEA cases. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311 (assuming the framework's
applicability in an ADEA case where neither party challenged it).
59. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Bullington v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Rinehart v. City of Inde
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Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscrimina
tory reason for its decision. 60 A legitimate nondiscriminatory rea
son is essential for an employer to survive a summary judgment
motion. 61 Although the employer's burden at this stage may ap
pear exceedingly light, the employer must "articulate its nondis
criminatory reason for the challenged action with some specificity
in order to afford the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to demon
strate pretext."62 Legitimate reasons commonly asserted by an em
ployer include the plaintiff's unsuitability or incompetence,63
economic factors,64 as well as various policy reasons. 65 Other exam
ples of legitimate reasons employers have articulated to rebut an
inference of discrimination include: lesser comparative qualifica
tions,66 inability to get along with supervisors or other employees,67
pendence; 35 F.3d 1263, 1264 (8th Cir. 1994); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d
1104,1110-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating the requirements for a prima facie case in a reduc
tion-in-force case); Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 920-21 (6th
Cir.1984).
60. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (discussing burdens of production and persua
sion in Title VII disparate treatment cases) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.
at 802).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1) (1994) (stating that an employer may defend an age
discrimination claim on the ground that differentiation was based on "reasonable fac
tors other than age").
62. See FIVE YEAR CuMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT TO SCHLEI & GROSSMAN'S EM·
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 480 & n.73 (David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe,
Jr., eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SUPP.].
63. See, e.g., Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comrn'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1995)
(upholding summary judgment for school district based on evidence that the plaintiff
was an ineffective teacher); Austin v. Cornell Univ., 891 F. Supp. 740, 747 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) (discussing employer's refusal to re-hire plaintiffs based on their past poor per
formance and inability to perform increased responsibilities).
64. See, e.g., Aremendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 150 (5th Cir.
1995) ("Job elimination or office consolidation is a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason
for discharge."); Allen v. Diebold Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding defend
ant's replacement of plaintiffs with younger, less costly workers did not state an ADEA
claim); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (observing in a
reduction-in-force case that "[e]conomic necessity is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for employment decisions") (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996) (find
ing that even if the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, summary judgment for
defendant would be upheld because refusal to hire was based on defendant's legitimate
weight standards); Kralman v. Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 157 (7th
Cir. 1994) (upholding rejection of plaintiff's job application where defendant gave hir
ing preference to a veteran); Roxas v. Presentation College, 885 F. Supp. 1323, 1328
(D.S.D. 1995) (finding a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason where employer's rejec
tion of employee's application for a paid sabbatical was based upon deficiencies in the
application submitted).
66. See, e.g., Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1991) (recog
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insubordination,68 and poor performance. 69 However, courts are
skeptical of an employer's reason when the employment decision is
based on vague sUbjective standards, such as the lack of dedication,
enthusiasm, and even ability or skill.70
If the employer sufficiently meets its burden of production, the
presumption of intentional discrimination disappears and the bur
den shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's articu
lated reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for
discrimination.?1 To meet this burden, the plaintiff cannot simply
nizing that a more qualified applicant was hired); Goetz v. Farm Credit Servs., 927 F.2d
398, 401 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing selection of better qualified applicant); Weber v.
Port Arthur Sch. Bd., 759 F. Supp. 341, 343 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (finding position filled by
more qualified applicant); Collins v. School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (W.D. Mo.
1990) (finding individual with superior work experience was hired).
67. See, e.g., McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that
employee was not promoted because she was caustic with other employees, made mis
takes, and did not follow instructions); Blake v. J.C. Penney Co., 894 F.2d 274, 278 (8th
Cir. 1990) (finding that employee was discharged for slapping a co-worker); Burrus v.
United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding employment decision
based on employee's inability to get along with others); Jones v. Lumberjack Meats,
Inc., 680 F.2d 98,101 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing poor relations with fellow employees
as a legitimate reason for discharge).
68. See, e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 777 (11th Cir. 1991) (recog
nizing that the refusal to follow company policies and disregarding orders from supervi
sors are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse employment action).
69. See, e.g., Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d
1104, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1989).
70. See McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (stat
ing that the employer's sole reliance on subjective selection criteria, including the fact
that the employee wanted a lot of time off and planned to quit soon, was "critical" to
the court's finding that the employer's asserted reasons could be considered pretextual);
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 871-72 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that where the
employer had only offered subjective and vague criteria for firing the employee, such as
one supervisor's evaluation that the employee was "not a good worker," and where
there were no guidelines for evaluating performance and no regular or written evalua
tions made on employees, the employer did not meet its burden of showing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason); cf. Baldwin v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp., 677 F.
Supp. 1573, 1581 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that employer used several objective reports
in addition to subjective evaluations to make its decision and acknowledging that some
subjectivity is unavoidable). See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP.,
supra note 62, at 484 & n.99 (noting that some courts scrutinize more closely employ
ment decisions when they are based on subjective criteria or standards).
71. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(indicating that the ultimate burden remains with the employee to prove intentional
discrimination); Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9,12 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the pre
sumption of discrimination disappears once the employer articulates a nondiscrimina
tory reason for its decision); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1994)
(indicating that no presumption of discrimination exists once the employer provides a
nondiscriminatory basis for its action); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th
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rely upon the prima facie case.72 Rather, "there must be some addi
tional evidence beyond the elements of the prima facie case to sup
port a finding of pretext."73 A plaintiff may establish pretext either
with direct evidence that the employer "was more likely than not
motivated by a discriminatory reason," or with indirect evidence
that the employer's explanation lacks credibility.74 This may be
accomplished if the plaintiff can show "such weaknesses, implausi
bilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the em
ployer's proffered reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence."75 The plaintiff
may also use comparative evidence 76 or statistics77 to demonstrate
Cir. 1994) (noting that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason eliminates the pre
sumption of discrimination created by the plaintiffs prima facie case); Carter v. City of
Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 584 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that in order to avoid a directed
verdict, the plaintiff must present "significantly probative" evidence of pretext).
72. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993) (finding that
once the defendant carries its burden of production, "'the presumption raised by the
prima facie case is rebutted,''' and the plaintiff must then prove that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the defendant were not the true reasons for the
employment decision) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255); see also Lam v. University of
Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that in order to prevail, "the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse employ
ment decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory") (quoting Wallis,
26 F.3d at 889); Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 1 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). In
addition, the employee may not rely solely on his or her subjective belief that the termi
nation resulted from age discrimination. See Molnar v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 986
F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1993); see also EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP., supra
note 62, at 266 & n.37.
73. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Wolf
v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the test of
pretext in an ADEA case is whether an employer honestly believes the reasons it gives,
not whether it made mistakes or bad business judgments) (citing McCoy v. WGN Con
tinental Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992»; Caponigro v. Navistar Int'!
Transp. Corp., No. 93-C-0647, 1995 WL 238655, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1995) (unre
ported decision) (finding that the plaintiff must show that each reason offered by the
employer is a pretext, although if the reasons are sufficiently intertwined, a successful
attack on one may call the others into doubt).
74. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 1993).
75. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1317 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v.
General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996))). It is not enough, how
ever, to assert that the employer's proffered reasons are not "wise, fair or correct";
rather, the question is whether the employer "honestly believed those reasons and ac
ted in good faith upon those beliefs." Id. at 1318 (citing Sanchez v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993»; see also Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dept. of
Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCoy, 957 F.2d at 373;
Pignato v. American Trans Air., Inc., 14 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994».
76. Comparative evidence shows that similarly situated employees outside of the
plaintiffs protected group received favored treatment, did not receive the same adverse
treatment, or that the employer's treatment of the plaintiff departed from its normal
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that an employer's reasoning for termination was simply a pretext
to cover underlying discrimination.
II.

"OVERQUALIFICATION" AND THE COURTS

The question of whether "overqualification" constitutes a legit
imate nondiscriminatory reason for denying employment is impor
tant to older applicants seeking work. If "overqualification" is
considered a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action,
employers will be free to prevent older applicants from re-entering
the workforce in entry-level positions. On the other hand, if "over
qualification" is considered a prohibited reason for denial of em
ployment, older applicants will have more opportunities available
to them when they seek employment. This issue has been consid
ered in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with varying results.
This section will discuss the decisions rendered by these courts.
A. Taggart v. Time Inc. 78
Thomas Taggart ("Taggart") was employed as a print produc
tion manager by Preview Subscription Television, Inc. ("Preview"),
a subsidiary of Time, Inc. ("Time"}.79 In May of 1983, Time noti
fied Preview employees that it intended to dissolve Preview and lay
off its employees. 8o On September 2, 1983, it did just that. 81 Tune
invited the laid-off employees to apply for job openings at Tune. 82
Of the more than thirty jobs at Time that Taggart applied for, he
obtained eight interviews. 83 Seven of the employers concluded that
policies or practices. See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP., supra
note 62, at 264-66; Carolyn Ratti Matthews, Comment, Accent: Legitimate Nondiscrimi
natory Reason or Permission to Discriminate?, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 231, 248 (1991).
77. See Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 556 (7th Cir. 1987); Weems
v. Ball Metal & Chern. Div., Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 531 (6th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C.
Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); Elliott v. Group Med. & Surgical Serv., 714
F.2d. 556 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'g No. 87 CIV. 3408 (MBM), 1990 WL 16956, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1990) (unreported decision).
79. See Taggart, 1990 WL 16956, at *l.
80. See id.
8l. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. Each of these employers conducted interviews with Taggart and stated
various reasons for not hiring him. See id. Such reasons included: interviewer thought
pressure would affect Taggart and that he appeared unenthusiastic about the job; others
had superior production backgrounds and made a better impression during the inter
view; interviewer was not impressed with Taggart or his ideas as to how to resolve
Time's operating deficiencies; he lacked electronic scanner skills and experience; he
made typographical errors in his resume; he scored lowest on color matching aptitude

62

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:45

Taggart was unqualified. 84 However, Home Box Office ("HBO"),
the eighth employer to interview Taggart, stated that it would not
hire Taggart because he was overqualified. 85 Consequently, on May
17, 1985, Taggart filed a claim of age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").86 On May 13,
1987, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, claiming that all eight inter
views were a sham and that his age was the real reason he was de
nied employment. 87
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas test88 and
concluded that Taggart failed to state a prima facie case of discrimi
nation because he did not show that he was "appropriately qualified
for many of the positions or that the evidence raise[ d] an inference
of discrimination."89 Further, the court stated that in all eight in
stances the "[d]efendant has satisfied its burden to articulate legiti
mate, non-age related reasons for refusing to rehire" Taggart and
that Taggart had not "rebutted those legitimate reasons by 'solid
circumstantial evidence' showing them to be mere pretexts."90
Thus, the district court granted summary judgment for Time.91
Taggart appealed the district court decision to the Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit.92 The Second Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment with respect to three of the four positions for
which Taggart was turned down on the basis that those decisions
were not age discriminatory.93 However, the appeals court dis
agreed with the trial court regarding the position at HBO.94 Specif
ically, the court of appeals rejected Time's argument that
"overqualified" can mean "unqualified."95 Rather, the court deter
mined that denying employment because of "overqualification"
test on job application; he failed to meet the basic job qualifications; he had no financial
experience; and he was argumentative during job application process. See id. at *4-6.
84. See id. at *4.
85. See id. Since the position was a "junior position," the interviewer thought the
job would not interest or challenge Taggart. See id.
86. See id. at *2.
87. See id.
88. See id. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test.
89. Taggart, 1990 WL 16956, at *9.
90. Id. (quoting Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d 1000, 1005 (2d Cir.
1987».
91. See id.
92. See Taggart v. Time hic., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
93. See id. at 46-47.
94. See id. at 47-48.
95. See id. at 47.
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alone may be "a euphemism to mask the real reason for refusal [to
hire], namely, [that] in the eyes of the employer the applicant is too
old."96 Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclu
sion that it was reasonable to exclude an overqualified applicant on
the grounds that the job would not challenge the applicant. 97 The
case was reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.98
B.

Stein v. National City Bank99

In March 1985, Sol Stein ("Stein") applied for a customer ser
vice representative position with National City Bank ("Bank").1°O
The Bank had an unwritten policy of not hiring college graduates
for that position because it believed that college graduates would
leave the position as soon they found that it was not sufficiently
challenging. IOI Because Stein had a college degree, he was not
hired.102 In June 1985, Stein filed a discrimination claim with the
EEOC based on age and/or religion. lo3 The EEOC determined
that the Bank did not discriminate against Stein on either
ground. 104 Stein then filed a discrimination complaint in federal
court based on violations of the ADEA and Title VII.105 The dis
trict court found that Stein failed to make out a prima facie case of
age discrimination and granted summary judgment to the Bank.106
Stein appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where the
court applied the McDonnell Douglas test. 107 It found that Stein
made out a prima facie case of age discrimination. lo8 However, the
court also found that the Bank's proffered reason for not hiring
Stein was legitimate.109 Specifically, the court was persuaded that a
policy of only hiring individuals who are more likely to remain em
96.

[d.

97. See id.
9S. See id. at 4S.
99. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991).
100. See id. at 1064.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1063-64.
104. See id. at 1064.
105. See id. He later abandoned his Title VII claim. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1064-65. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the McDonnell
Douglas factors and the test's use as a burden-shifting device in Title VII cases.
lOS. See id. at 1064-65. Plaintiff made out a prima facie case because he was (1) a
member of the protected class; (2) subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) qual
ified for the position; and (4) replaced by a younger person. See id.
109. See id.
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ployed for a prolonged period of time would promote the em
ployer's interest in reducing turnover.110 Further, the court
reasoned that turnover could also be decreased if the company did
not hire individuals who would get bored easily or could obtain bet
ter jobS. 111 Although Stein argued that reducing turnover was
pre textual because the hiring policy was not uniformly applied and
was unreasonable because it failed to achieve its purported ends,
the court summarily concluded that Stein's assertions were without
merit and upheld summary judgment for the employer.112
C. EEOC v; Insurance Co. of North America113
In June 1988, Richard Pugh ("Pugh") responded to an adver
tisement for a "loss control representative" by submitting a resume
to Insurance Co. of North America ("ICNA").114 Pugh had more
than thirty years experience in loss control and engineering. 11s De
spite this fact, Pugh was never interviewed for the position. 116 He
filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging age discrimination.1 17 In
response, ICNA claimed that it did not interview Pugh because "he
was overqualified ... would have delved too deeply into accounts
... and [would have unnecessarily] consume[d] too much of the
insureds' time. "118 The district court found that Pugh established a
prima facie case of age discrimination. 119 To meet its burden,
ICNA explained that it rejected Pugh because he had an unprofes
sional resume and his background was too technical for the posi
tion.1 20 Upon concluding that ICNA's proffered reasons were
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and not pretextual,121 the district
court granted summary judgment for ICNA.122 Subsequently, the
EEOC appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 123
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed that the
principal reason Pugh was rejected was that he was considered
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1065-66.
49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1419.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1419-20 & n.1.
See id. at 1420.
See id.
See id. at 1419.
See id.
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overqualified; the court did not address whether the alternative rea
sons for rejecting Pugh were supportive of a summary judgment
motion. 124 The court noted that the rejection of an applicant on the
basis of "overqualification" may sometimes function as a proxy for
age discrimination. 125 However, the court held that a refusal to hire
a prospective employee based on an honest belief that he is over
qualified for a position does not by itself violate the ADEA.126 In
deed, the Ninth Circuit determined that ICNA's rejection of Pugh
due to his "overqualification" was based on a defined business in
terest,127 The court further found that the company's reason for
rejecting Pugh was objective, non-age related, and that the evidence
supported the conclusion that ICNA's rejection was not a mask for
age discrimination. 128
While Taggart, Stein, and Insurance Co. of North America ad
dressed the use of "overqualification" by employers as a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for employment decisions that affect
older workers, the question remains as to whether "overqualifica
tion," standing alone, should be recognized by the courts as a legiti
mate reason to deny employment, thus requiring age discrimination
plaintiffs to prove it is pretextual. To answer this question it is nec
essary to analyze the three cases in light of the types of criteria that
employers use in making employment decisions.
III.

"OVERQUALIFICATION": PRETEXT OR LEGITIMATE
NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON

This section will show that the use of "overqualification" as a
reason for rejecting an applicant can be, and often is, a mask for age
discrimination. However, since "overqualification" can also be a
legitimate reason for an adverse employment decision, this section
will explore the various methods and devices used by employers
when making employment decisions and analyze the extent to
which these devices may provide objective evidence to support an
employer's claim that "overqualification" was the employer's legiti
mate nondiscriminatory reason. This section will further show that
while Taggert and Stein were correctly decided, Insurance Co. of
North America was not. Lastly, this section will further assert that
124. See id.
or hire Pugh was
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.

at 1420 n.2 (stating that "the primary reason leNA did not interview
that it considered him overqualified for the position").
at 1420-21.
at 1420.
at 1421.
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employers who rely solely on subjective reasons to justify adverse
employment decisions, such as an applicant's "overqualification"
for the position, will expose themselves to potential discrimination
lawsuits.
A.

"Overqualification": Evidence of Discrimination?

Employers generally rely on two types of criteria when at
tempting to assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for hiring,
promotion, transfer, and discharge decisions: objective and subjec
tive criteria. Objective 129 criteria typically include: scored tests,13°
education requirements,131 work experience,132 or performance,133
Such criteria are neutral because they are applied mechanically and
without exception to all applicants and employees and leave little or
no room for the use of discretion. Nevertheless, objective criteria
can be the basis of either a disparate impact or disparate treatment
claim. A disparate impact claim may exist if the application of the
neutral criteria has an adverse impact on a protected group.134 A
disparate treatment claim may also exist if a criterion is applied in a
129. Objective is defined as "expressing or involving the use of facts without dis
tortion by personal feelings or prejudices." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
1556 (3d ed. 1993).
130. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971); EEOC v. Navajo
Ref. Co., 593 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1979).
131. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 895 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir.
1990) (remanding for determination whether prerequisites for admission into an electri
cian apprenticeship program (high school diploma requirement and maximum age
limit) have any disparate impact on African Americans and women); Briggs v. Ander
son, 796 F.2d 1009, 1023 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff "failed to show that the
degree requirement did not 'bear a demonstrable relationship to successful perform
ance of the [job] for which it is used"') (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431); Carpenter v.
Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983) (using high school education
requirement); Navajo Ref Co., 593 F.2d at 992 (stating that the "company is free to use
its tests and high school education requirements if the result is not discrimination in
fact"); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the
defendants failed to prove that the college degree requirement was justified by business
necessity).
132. See, e.g., Foster v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 872 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir.
1989) (requiring prior administrative experience for position as school principal);
Cooper v. Allen, 493 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring five years experience to
become professional golfer).
133. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring that
police officers qualify with a 12-gauge shotgun fired from the shoulder); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 734 (1st Cir. 1972) (requiring a swim test for police officers).
134. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of age discrimination based on disparate
impact.
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different manner to certain protected class members.135
By contrast, subjective136 criteria allow for the use of discretion
by the decision maker. 137 An employer using subjective criteria
draws on his or her perspectives, beliefs, experiences, and judgment
when making a decision. Subjective selection devices include: in
terviews, performance appraisals not based on "hard" data such as
quantifiable attendance or production records, nepotism, and the
use of "grapevine" hiring or promotion systems which selectively
announce job openings.138 In addition, employment valuations
based on a person's leadership or aggressiveness, ability to fit in,
interpersonal skills, or other traits such as personal appearance, in
terest, attitude, and personality constitute subjective criteria. 139
These discretionary criteria are standardless in the sense that there
are no identifiable means by which they can be measured. Conse
quently, the application of subjective devices is characterized by a
lack of uniformity.
Whether based on objective or subjective criteria, ADEA vio
lations may be established by proving either disparate treatment or
disparate impact. 14o As a practical matter, plaintiffs can more easily
attack subjective criteria under the disparate treatment theory be
135. See supra Part LB for a discussion of age discrimination based on disparate
treatment.
136. Subjective is defined as "peculiar to a particular individual modified by indi
vidual bias and limitations: personal." WEBSTER'S TlflRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
2275-76 (3d ed. 1993).
137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6B(I) (1999) (referring to subjective criteria as "infor
mal" or "unscored" procedures); Andrea R. Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal
Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 45, 48 (1979) (stating that subjective procedures are those in which "judgment
or discretion [is exercised] on the part of the evaluator"). See generally EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW SUPP., supra note 62, at 194-206 (discussing the characteristics of
subjective employment practices).
138. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in
Support of Petitioner at 14, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)
(citing BENJAMIN SCHNEIDER & NEAL SCHMITT, STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed.
1986); IRWIN L. GOLDSTEIN, TRAINING IN ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1986».
139. See Donald R. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Ti
tle VII, 10 GA. L. REv. 737, 737, 740-41 (1976); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 812 n.26 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (examining em
ployer evaluations of employees on such factors as drive, friendliness, courtesy, and
personal appearance).
140. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1993) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court has "not yet addressed the question whether such a
claim is cognizable under the ADEA, and there are substantial arguments that it is
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA"). The
majority agreed that the issue was an open question. See id. at 610. See supra Part I.B
for a discussion of the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of liability.
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cause offering statistical evidence of subjective data is very difficult
and costly.141 In an ADEA disparate treatment case, the question
that must be answered when subjective evidence is presented by an
employer as its legitimate reason for an employment decision is
whether the employment decision was wholly motivated by non-age
factors.142 This question is of the utmost importance because if it is
not answered in the affirmative, an age discrimination suit will be
dismissed in favor of the employer. However, if plaintiffs can get
past the summary judgment stage and to a jury, their chances of
obtaining a favorable settlement or jury award improve substan
tially, since juries tend to favor employees over employers.
When analyzing whether subjective criteria are legitimate and
nondiscriminatory, courts often consider whether the employer uses
criteria based upon observable behaviors or job performance rat
ings rather than personal traits.143 Another factor to be considered
is whether the employer uses objective criteria in conjuJ;lction with
the sUbjective criteria in the decision-making process. 144 Absent
objective evidence that clearly indicates that the subjective criterion
itself, rather than age, was the decisive factor in the employment
decision, a claim for age discrimination should proceed so that a
fact finder may have an opportunity to scrutinize the defendant's
credibility .
Although subjective employment criteria are especially suscepSee supra note 33 for lower court cases that have applied both theories of liability in
ADEA cases.
141. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 869-70 (D. Minn.
1993) (holding defendants liable under both disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims by the plaintiffs); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 330-36 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (analyzing relief under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theory
for respondent's subjective decision making).
142. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611. "In a disparate treatment case, liabil
ity depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated
the employer's decision." Id. at 610 (citations omitted). "'Proof of discriminatory mo
tive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment. ...'" Id. at 609 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324,335-36 n.15 (1977)). See supra Part 1.B.2 for a discussion of the burdens of proof in
a disparate treatment case.
143. See Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the
use of such subjective criteria as 'dedicated' and 'enthusiasm' may offer a convenient
pretext for giving force and effect to prejudice, and can create a strong inference of
employment discrimination") (citing Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th
Cir. 1983)); cf Lerma v. Bolger, 689 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that subjec
tive evaluations made in good faith and based upon the successful candidate's record as
an employee rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination).
144. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of objective
and subjective criteria used in decision-making.
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tible to abuse because of the large amount of discretion they confer
on the decision maker, there is nothing inherently wrong or unlaw
ful in using subjective criteria to make employment decisions. 145
Courts have approved the use of subjective criteria that are related
to the skills demanded by a position and are used fairly as part of a
reasonably circumscribed procedure. 146 Indeed, fairness to both
the applicant and the employer may require using such criteria be
cause exclusively using objective criteria might not lead to hiring
the best person for the position. Subjective criteria such as a per
son's ability to get along with others and impressions gleaned from
an interview are criteria that are important in determining if a per
son is a "fit" for the job in question. Nevertheless, as an evaluation
becomes less objective, the risk that an employer's use of SUbjective
criteria masks discriminatory motive increases.
Courts have reasoned that the risk that subjective criteria is a
front that permits the employer to discriminate on the basis of age
is too great to allow the employer to rely on such criteria as a "legit
imate" reason for adverse employment decisions.1 47 The concern is
that an employer would then be able to articulate any vague asser
tion regarding qualification or experience levels to defeat a plain
tiff's discrimination claim. Thus, in cases where the employer uses
only SUbjective criteria upon which to base its adverse employment
decision, there is an increased risk that the employer is using a
proxy as a mask for age discrimination, and at the very least, a fac
tual inference of age discrimination may exist. 148
145. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) ("[A]n
employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower
level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discrinlinatory conduct. "); McKnight
v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that subjective
methods of appraising performance are not in and of themselves discriminatory,
although they are susceptible to discriminatory application); Mallory v. Booth Refriger
ation Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the use of subjective
criteria, standing alone, does not prove a violation, although the use of subjective crite
ria is relevant).
146. See, e.g., Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
"[s]ubjective criteria necessarily and legitimately enter into personnel decisions involv
ing supervisory positions"); Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d
Cir. 1988) (stating that when a company deems a trait essential it has a right to make a
business decision based on that trait); McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of
Educ., 791 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he use of recommendations
does not, because they are subjective, require [the court] to invalidate the school sys
tem's promotion procedure").
147. See Rowe v. General Motors Co., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (analyz
ing subjective criteria in a Title VII case).
148. See id.

70

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:45

In the three cases discussed in Part II, Taggart,149 Stein/ 50 and
Insurance Co. of North America,l51 older applicants were rejected
because the employers felt that they were overqualified. 152 These
cases suggest that there is a natural correlation between "over
qualification" and age because older people are likely to have been
in the workforce longer and have greater work experience. Thus,
the term overqualified, when used to reject an applicant, can be a
disguise for a rejection that relies on age. 153 However, the court in
each case reached a different result, suggesting an area of confusion
in the way courts handle the issue of "overqualification."
B.

Taggart v. Time Inc.

In Taggart v. Time Inc.,154 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case
of age discrimination 155 and recognized that "overqualification" is
often correlated with age. 156 When the employer was required to
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment de
cision, it stated that Taggart was rejected because he was overquali
fied. 157 As a result, the employer believed that the job would not
challenge him, and he would likely seek other employment. 15s The
court questioned whether these non-age reasons were the real rea
sons for rejecting Taggart. 159 Significantly, the employer did not of
fer any objective evidence to support its claim that overqualified
candidates are likely to seek other employment. In fact, there is
evidence to the contrary: older workers are often viewed as better
workers in comparison to workers of any other age category regard
ing skill, experience, and work ethic, including punctuality, good at
tendance, and reliability.1 60 In Taggart, the employer might have
been able to convince the court that its reason was legitimate and
nondiscriminatory by producing objective evidence to support its
149. See supra Part ILA.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. See supra Part ILA-C for a discussion of these cases.
153. See supra Part II.A & C for examples of courts that have found that over
qualified may indeed be a euphemism for age.
154. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
155. See id. at 46.
156. See id. at 47.
157. See id. See supra Part LB for a discussion of the allocation of burdens in
discrimination cases.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 47-48.
160. See generally DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE, supra note 5, at 8-9.
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subjective claim. 161 For example, Time could have tried to show
that overqualified workers are poor performers, create high turno
ver, or bear some demonstrable relationship to performance on the
particular job for which Taggart was being interviewed. However,
because no such evidence was offered, the court carefully scruti
nized the employer's stated reason and rejected it.1 62
When Congress enacted the ADEA, it was concerned that
older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes. 163 The employer's subjec
tive reason in Taggart is an example of just such an inaccurate, stig
matizing, and age-based stereotype that prompted Congress to
enact the ADEA.1 64 Thus, the Second Circuit properly scrutinized
the employer's subjective reasons. Because "overqualification" is
correlated with age, and because the employer did not offer any
objective or identifiable evidence to support its claim that actual
"overqualification" and not age was its reason for not hiring Tag
gart, the court properly remanded the case to the district court for a
trial on the merits.165
C.

Stein v. National City Bank

In Stein v. National City Bank,l66 the Sixth Circuit also recog
nized that the applicant made out a prima facie case, thus requiring
the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
adverse employment action. 167 In this case, the employer also re
jected the applicant based on his "overqualification"; however, the
161. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the use of subjective versus objective
evidence as it applies to legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons offered by employers in
discrimination claims.
162. See Taggart, 924 F.2d at 4748.
163. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the history of the ADEA.
164. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). In Hazen Paper,
the Supreme Court stated in dicta that (1) disparate treatment "captures the essence of
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA," and (2) Congress enacted the ADEA
out of a concern that "older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis
of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes." Id. at 610. However, "[w]hen the em
ployer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccu
rate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears." Id. at 611. (emphasis in original); see also
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that disparate impact is a viable theory in age cases, since it is a
means to detect employment decisions based on inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes).
165. See Taggart, 924 F.2d at 48.
166. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991).
167. See id. at 1064-65; see supra Part I.B for a discussion of the allocation of
burdens in discrimination claims.
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employer relied on a general policy of not hiring college gradu
ates. 168 The policy was an effort to prevent high turnover rates in
its customer service representative positions. 169 While the use of
"overqualification," standing alone, is a subjective reason for an ad
verse employment decision and is carefully scrutinized by the
courts,17° the employer in Stein utilized an "overqualification" pol
icy that had objective (i.e., measurable) criteria. l7l The policy of
not hiring college graduates for certain jobs operated on the reason
able assumption that persons without college degrees would not be
as readily employable by a different employer. l72 Hence, both per
sons under and over the age of forty would be rejected under the
hiring scheme. Because the employer supported its rejection of the
plaintiff with an objective measure-whether the applicant had a
college degree-the Sixth Circuit was able to determine that the
policy was reasonable and applied in a nondiscriminatory man
ner. 173 The court concluded that the reason proffered by the de
fendant to reject the older applicant was, in fact, motivated by a
non-age factor. 174 Thus, the employer rightly succeeded in its mo
tion for summary judgmentP5
D.

EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North America

Like in Taggart and Stein, the court in EEOC v. Insurance Co.
of North America,176 recognized that the applicant made out a
prima facie case of age discrimination. l77 Thus, the employer was
required to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its ad
verse employment decision. 178 This employer also offered "over
168. See Stein, 942 F.2d at 1064.
169. See id. However, the policy was unwritten and "no statistical study or other
empirical data supports the assumptions" that it would prevent high turnover. See id. at
1065.
170. See, e.g., Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating that "overqualification" policies may "serve as a mask for age discrimination"
so courts need to make sure that policies are adopted in good faith); Taggart v. Time
Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing how "overqualification" policies can
be used to discriminate based on age).
171. See Stein, 942 F.2d at 1066.
172. See id. at 1065.
173. See id. at 1066.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
177. See id. at 1419-20.
178. See id.; see supra Part I.B for a discussion on the allocation of burdens in
discrimination claims.
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qualification" as its reason for rejecting the plaintiff.179 The
employer further explained that it feared "that someone with
Pugh's extensive background ... would delve too deeply into ...
assign[ments]."180 The Ninth Circuit held that this was an objective
and non-age related reason for the rejection and granted summary
judgment for the employer.181 However, because the employer's
proffered reason was purely subjective,182 it should have been more
carefully scrutinized just as the court of appeals did in Taggart. 183
In contrast to the employer in Stein, ICNA did not maintain an
objective hiring policy that could justify its subjective reason for not
hiring Pugh. l84 In addition, the employer failed to offer evidence in
support of its conclusion that an older worker would "delve too
deeply" or even to explain how "delving too deeply" would be a
potential problem.185 Moreover, it is arguable that a younger
worker who delved deeply into accounts would not be seen in such
a negative light, but rather would be viewed as aggressive or a po
tentialleader of the company. Stigmatizing stereotypes that suggest
that older employees are liabilities rather than assets are precisely
what the ADEA was enacted to protect against.1 86 Because the
employer's conclusions were unsupported by any statistical, empiri
cal, or otherwise measurable evidence, the rejection based solely on
"overqualification" was likely a mask for age discrimination. Thus,
the employer's summary judgment motion should have been de
feated. Such a result would have allowed the case to proceed to a
jury which could have then assessed the credibility of the employer.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff and all older applicants, the Ninth
Circuit ruled otherwise. 187

E.

Suggestion to Employers

People of all ages often find themselves unemployed. Such a
change can be both economically and emotionally devastating.
179. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1419.
180. Id. at 1421.
181. See id.
182. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the use of subjective evidence in
discrimination suits.
183. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the Second Circuit's finding in Tag
gart that "overqualification," by itself, is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
an adverse employment action.
184. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the objective hiring policy in Stein.
185. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421.
186. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the purpose of the ADEA.
187. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421.
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However, the problem is compounded for an older person who has
been terminated, since the prospect of finding a job in the same
field of work or at the same managerial level is limited because such
positions are already filled by long-term employees or because the
workforce has been reduced. 188 In order to remain productive and
support their families, an older person may be forced to apply for
any position which is open.
Employers who are reluctant to hire older people for entry
level positions based on a belief that they are overqualified not only
run the risk of violating the ADEA, but also contribute to larger
societal problems. For instance, a large number of older persons
who are unable to find work will result in a reduction of both in
come and confidence for many Americans. 189 These problems will
continue to increase if employers are reluctant to hire older work
ers because they subjectively believe an applicant is "unqualified"
simply because the applicant appears to be "overqualified." Thus,
employers faced with an applicant or employee who they do not
believe is suited for the position should be cautious about, if not
avoid entirely, not hiring or promoting that person based upon a
subjective trait such as "overqualification."
However, an employer who makes decisions based on an appli
cant's subjective qualities may take steps to avoid the possibility of
ADEA litigation. Specifically, if an employer bases employment
decisions on SUbjective traits, it should set forth in its hiring policy
all the desired qualities that can only be evaluated subjectively.
Traits and qualities that require subjective determination should di
rectly correlate with an applicant or employee's ability to perform
the job. This serves to demonstrate the legitimacy of the criterion
at issue by showing that the trait is important to the position. An
employer should also use objective factors in conjunction with sub
jective decision-making when hiring, promoting, firing, and taking
other employment actions. l90 In the event of litigation, the addi
tional use of objective criteria may reduce the likelihood that a
188. See DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE, supra note 5, at 5 n.2.
189. See id. at 2, 5 n.5 (noting that a Louis and Harris survey, conducted in 1989,
reported that one million workers aged 50 to 64 believed that they would be forced to
retire before they were ready). Most of this group, anticipating an unwanted early re
tirement, said they would prefer to v. ark for years longer. See id. Another Harris sur
vey, conducted in 1992, found that 5.4 million older Americans, one in seven of those 55
and older who were not working at that time, were willing to work but could not find a
suitable job. See id.
190. See supra Part lILA for a discussion on the appropriateness of using subjec
tive criteria in employment decision-making.
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court will find that the employment action was based on age related
factors.
An employer should use objective criteria, rather than subjec
tive criteria, to evaluate whether an applicant is overqualified. If
possible, the employer should also use objective criteria to deter
mine the relative qualifications of the individual, which will bolster
the employer's claim that the applicant was rejected for a legiti
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, should litigation ensue. If an em
ployer uses sUbjective criteria, it should maintain a hiring policy
that indicates the relationship between a worker's subjective traits
and the position at issue. The hiring policy will help employers de
fend their use of sUbjective criteria in future litigation by demon
strating that even thought the sUbjective trait played a role in the
employment decision, other legitimate factors were also considered.
CONCLUSION

The ADEA does not require employers to give preferential
treatment to older applicants. However, it does require that an
older applicant, who is equally or more qualified than any other
applicant, not be denied an equal opportunity in the hiring process
because of his or her age. While using subjective criteria to make
employment decisions is not per se unlawful, employers may avoid
liability if they produce objective and identifiable reasons for their
employment decisions in order to support their claims that a partic
ular adverse decision was not based on age. A requirement that
"overqualification" be supported by objective standards would ad
vance the policy goals of the ADEA by ensuring that older workers
receive equal opportunity for jobs, while maintaining an employer's
ability to seek out and retain the most suitable employees.

